How China Projects Its Power
China displayed its might on Wednesday. Tens of thousands of spectators in Beijing watched the People’s Republic of China unveil laser weapons, nuclear ballistic missiles, and giant underwater drones, along with armored vehicles, tanks, and parade soldiers whose prowess astounded the rest of the world. Some 26 world leaders, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, joined Xi Jinping as spectators.
This elaborate display comes two days after the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, which was attended not only by leaders unpopular in the West, but also by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and traditional US allies.
The SCO has come a long way. A quarter century ago, roughly when Putin came to power and long before Xi and Modi entered the world stage, the SCO was a quiet backstage, with China and a handful of Central Asian states attempting to project a modicum of importance. But today, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is the world’s largest regional bloc, representing 30% of global GDP.
SCO member states resist specific alliances. But if there’s one issue that unites them, it’s discontent with the US-led international order. China is embroiled in a second round of a trade war that President Donald Trump started six years ago during his first term. Russia is still reeling from long-standing US support for Ukraine following the Kremlin’s full-scale invasion. India now faces 50% tariffs for not complying with Trump’s trade policy.
Kim’s attendance at the military parade, the first by a North Korean leader since 1959, underscores that this is a disaffected group of forces—and China is happy to mobilize them. After all, Pyongyang has been Washington’s most consistent and long-standing adversary. China, and even Russia, have experienced longer and deeper periods of accommodation with the United States.
But deep differences remain between these countries. They lack trust, shared values, or a common vision. The key attendees at the SCO and the military parade may not like a world order still dominated by the United States. But there are significant, and in some cases, conflicting, differences over what they want from the future.
The stakes are higher for China. Despite all the friendly words and images, Xi does not consider any of the other SCO members an economic or geopolitical rival. China’s economy is eight times the size of Russia’s and three times the size of India’s. Beijing is still exploring the possibility of a favorable trade deal with Trump, and unlike other countries, it may well get one.
How Russia and India feel about China’s rise is clear from their recent histories. Modi is as nationalistic as Xi and is no doubt irritated by the confidence and assertiveness of his larger eastern neighbor. New Delhi has never joined the Belt and Road Initiative and has notably banned TikTok and other China-linked apps. India has a competing vision of itself as a great power, hoping to one day become a match for China and the United States. Remarkably, it is China, and not any of the other five permanent members, that is resisting India’s bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council.
For Russia, the issue is dealing with a power it relies on, but with which it still harbors significant differences. Anyone who has visited Russia will recognize, when it comes to China, that there are persistent suspicions about its regional intentions in the Far East. Putin is also a staunch nationalist. It is interesting to speculate about how he might truly feel about increasingly appearing, these days, as a junior partner to Beijing.
If there is any message from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, it is how these very different powers find it necessary to work together because of the contradictions and challenges posed by the Trump administration. But Wednesday’s military parade, the largest ever held by China, also demonstrates that the emerging global order, whatever it may be, is governed by harsh realism, self-interest, and opportunism.
China may find it much more difficult to lead a rival bloc than to be part of the old order, which now appears to be eroding.
